The conventional focus on the training participation rate, rather than training volume, in official statistics and research has obscured a radical transformation in workers' training in Britain. To obtain a picture of the trend in training volume, we synthesise a narrative through a new analysis of multiple surveys. The duration of training fell sharply with the result that the training volume per worker declined by about a half between 1997 and 2012. This fall is hard to reconcile with optimistic rhetoric surrounding the knowledge economy. Potential explanations are discussed. We conclude with recommendations to improve the collection of training statistics.
Introduction
Although much has been gleaned about workplace training and certain regularities uncovered, the diversity of data sources and the sporadic dissemination of their findings have delivered only a piece-meal appreciation of the big picture surrounding the trends in job-related training. Many commentators -ourselves included -have as a consequence hitherto missed the fact that in the last 15 years there has been a sea change in the volume of training received by the average worker in Britain.
Training matters enormously because of the importance of skill formation at work in a modern-day economy. There is therefore a need to optimise relevant government policies, and the European Union accordingly has set targets for participation in adult learning. With the revelation of low and unequal literacy and numeracy skills of young adults in England and Northern Ireland, the training trend becomes especially important in Britain for the future skills of the adult workforce (OECD, 2013) .
Estimates of the returns to training are generally positive and substantial, both in Britain and elsewhere (e.g. Blundell et al., 1996; Dearden et al., 2006; Vignoles et al., 2004; Booth and Bryan, 2005; Brunello et al., 2012) .
Unfortunately, most analyses and official public statistics concerning training have focussed exclusively on the participation rate in training. Yet the participation rate is a poor indicator for the contribution of training to skill formation, because the duration of training varies very considerably over time and between countries and workplaces.
The focus on participation thus has the potential to be misleading. Data on the volume of training -which, along with quality, is the best indicator of training's contribution to skill formation -by contrast has been scattered and sparsely disseminated.
Our first main objective in this paper is to demonstrate and call attention to the major change in training volumes in Britain. This change has hitherto been neither debated nor recognised. In order to achieve this, we draw on multiple sources to synthesise a picture of training volume trends for the first time. As a subsidiary to this first objective we also consider the significance for skill formation of the revealed trends, and point to what would be needed to achieve an adequate understanding of what lies behind them. Our second main objective follows from the first: by exposing the problems arising from an exclusive focus on the participation rate, we hope to influence the future collection and dissemination of training statistics.
Following a review in Section 2 of how training trends relate to the concept of the knowledge economy and of relevant prior empirical studies, in Sections 3 and 4 we bring together findings about training trends from multiple high-quality surveys.
Because the narrative has been scattered in multiple sources, mostly unpublished, their message has been missed. Interpreting and explaining the change is not straightforward; in Section 5 we discuss potential explanations and suggest what might be needed to test them in future. In the Conclusion we propose that analysts and policy-makers concerned with training and learning would profit from an improved statistical service, and conclude by offering recommendations.
Training and the Knowledge Economy. 1
Theories of the modern economy bring contrasting expectations about training. The assumption that industrialised economies have become, or are becoming, knowledgebased carries hypotheses about the level and trend of workplace skill formation. The knowledge-based economy is characterised also as a learning economy (OECD, 1996) . If technological change is substantive and skill-biased, the new needed skills could not be delivered only through the education system, for two fundamental reasons: first, most of the adult population is at work, so the pace of expansion of skills in the workforce would be limited by the natural pace at which new generations of college-leavers replace retirees; second, many of the new skills can only be acquired in work settings. If an economy is assumed to be already a fully-fledged knowledge economy, one expects to see higher levels of workplace skill formation (relative to previous eras) to generate both the work skills that cannot be learned during school and college education, and the new skills that become needed through innovation-driven growth. If, rather, it is claimed that a country is transitioning towards being a knowledge economy, then the presumption is that skill formation will be rising.
In the knowledge-economy literature, this prediction about skill formation is typically translated into an expectation and objective that training will be increasing in the period of transition towards a knowledge economy, and to be sustained at high levels thereafter. In Europe, increased access to training has been stressed by the European Council as integral to its strategy for competitiveness, and in particular for achieving its 'Europe 2020' objectives in its 'Agenda for new skills and new jobs' initiative (European Council, 2007) . Since it also has become widely recognised that wage compression and various labour market imperfections that inhibit mobility are sufficient to give firms the incentives to contribute to funding transferable as well as firm-specific training (e.g. Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998) , it is expected that firms and individuals would both be increasing their investments in transferable skills as the knowledge economy develops.
Yet such a prediction may not be warranted. Notably, there has developed a considerable critique of the concept of the knowledge economy. Writers point to the contradictions of the skills race in an increasingly globalised economy, seeing the 'global war for talent' and its associated discourse, for example, as a new phase in the development of neo-liberalism, and highlighting the constraints on training policies (Markowitsch et al., 2013) . Many are especially sceptical of the idea that Britain can be characterised as a knowledge economy. Critics hold that the country has been on a low-skills trajectory, and question the strength of the putative increasing demand for workplace skill formation. Rather, the British economy is in this view likely to retain a large tranche of low-quality jobs, a weak set of occupational identities that diminish incentives to learn, a narrowly conceived vocational training system that lead to vocational qualifications that have little worth on the labour market, and a low employer demand for qualifications relative to employers in other developed economies. Compounding these problems Britain's especially flexible labour market, it is maintained, exacerbates the externality problem that firms face, discouraging them from funding transferable training in the absence of cooperative solutions.
Among the important critiques in this mould are Finegold and Soskice (1989), Crouch et al. (2001) , Mayhew and Keep (2010) , Brown and Tannock (2010) and Keep and James (2012) . And, capping these structural critiques, others identified a failure on the part of the Labour government that took power in 1997 to introduce a transformative skills agenda, its programme lamented as "long on rhetoric and vision, but ...rather short on delivery" (Taylor, 2005: 109; see also Holford and Welikala, 2013) .
Whatever position one takes about the knowledge economy theory and its critique, the demand for skill formation is seen as highly dependent on the selected path of development, encompassing economic, fiscal and institutional drivers and evolving management strategies (Green, 2013) . The knowledge-economy may be presented as an aspiration, but whether it is becoming a reality is an open question. A fair generalisation is that those who proclaim the reality of the knowledge-based economy expect to see an increasing volume and quality of training as the knowledge-economy develops. To what extent has this expectation been realised in recent decades?
It has been surprisingly difficult to answer this seemingly simple question. Although the trend in the volume of workplace training should be one of the central variables characterising the model of a knowledge economy, descriptions of training trends over the long term are rarely focussed on indicators for the important concepts. Above all, indicators for the volume and quality of training are needed. The key volume indicator is the time per worker spent in training in a given period. Quality is constituted by training's putative generative impact on skill; this could either be measured for each unit of training undergone (to be referred to as "unit training quality"), or for the total training in the given period (to be referred to as "total training quality"). Also relevant is the training investment cost (both direct and opportunity cost), which combines the volume and the price of the investment.
Commentary on continuing workplace training has, however, largely centred on the participation rate (UKCES, 2009), not the volume. Because the participation rate over a four-week period had become somewhat higher than in the 1990s, then coasted along at around 15%, workplace training was not news. Unlike with education and youth training, the country came out quite well in international comparisons of workplace training participation rates (Leitch Review of Skills, 2005) . Recently some commentators have noted the fact that participation rates had edged a little below their peak in the early 2000s (Clancy, 2009; Mason and Bishop, 2010; Mason, 2010) .
Meanwhile most academic analyses have also focused on participation rates (e.g. Murphy et al., 2008; Jones et al., 2007; Boheim and Booth, 2004; Booth and Bryan, 2005; Vignoles et al., 2004; Dearden et al., 2006; Roosmaa and Saar, 2012) . With exceptions (e.g. Hoque and Bacon, 2008 ) duration and quality were neglected in quantitative studies despite earlier indications that the trend in the volume of training could be in the opposite direction to movements in the participation rate, and that training quality was also of concern (Felstead et al., 1997; 1999; Green and Zanchi, 1997) . The volume and quality of training have since been largely off the radar, despite their prominence in qualitative studies of training and in the debate about apprenticeships (Gospel, 1998; Felstead et al, 2009) . No data on trends in the volume or quality of training are published in official sources.
Methodology and Data
In addressing this lacuna, we began with awareness of the fact that training measurement can sometimes be problematic, owing to the multiplicity of forms that training takes (including informal training), and to respondents' difficulties of recall over long periods (Felstead et al., 1999) . Our strategy was to piece together a description of training trends from all available trustworthy sources that covered the previous two decades; even if they gave different numbers because they referred to different definitions or periods of training, it was hoped to find that the pattern of change over time would be consistent across sources.
We found eight series of surveys of individuals and three of employers, covering all available series which have data on some aspects of training in two or more years, and which are of high quality and representative of either the UK as a whole or of one or more UK nations. The series are (with source references at the end of the paper): the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), the Continuous Vocational Training Survey (CVTS), the Employer Skills Survey (ESS1), the European Social Survey (ESS2), the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), the NIACE Survey on Adult Participation in Learning, the National Adult Learner Survey (NALS), the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), the Skills and Employment Surveys (SES), and two Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS).
Findings
In what follows we report figures derived from our own analyses of the surveys, or in a few cases from a public database or survey report. The salient features of training trends that emerge are summarised in Table 1 . a) Aggregate Training Volume.
The Individual As Informant.
To capture training comprehensively the Skills and Employment Surveys (SES) specify explicit types of job-related training: training off-the-job, receiving instruction while performing the job, self-teaching with manuals, internet etc., following a correspondence or internet course, taking an evening class, other job-related training.
They show that the annual training participation rate (among those aged 20 to 65) rose a little, from 65% in 2006 to 68% in 2012. The surveys also asked respondents to report the number of separate days during the year in which they took part in each form of training. The total number of days for all forms of training declined substantially: in 2006 41% of training recipients had received training on no more than 10 days in the year; this proportion rose to 49% in 2012; the median number of days fell from five to four. Including those not training, we find an overall reduction in training volume from 51.2 to 34.9 annual days per worker, a fall of 32%. 2 The Quarterly Labour Force Survey QLFS records whether participants had "taken part in any education or any training connected with your job, or a job that you might be able to do in the future" -a question which, since it is not anchored with examples and is in a minority of cases addressed to proxies, probably captures fewer training episodes than SES. Supplementary questions permit study of training duration for those participating in the previous week only, and of the length of the latest training spell. Figure 1 presents the commonly-cited 4-week participation rate. It shows that among the employed the training participation rate was rising through the 1990s, going from 12.8% in 1995, arriving at a peak of 15.1% in 2001. It then fell by more than two percentage points to 13.0% in 2010. Thereafter it has remained roughly steady. The figure also reconfirms the conclusion that there were no sharp breaks around the time of the economic crisis in 2008-9 (Felstead et al., 2012) . Figure 1 also shows that this inverted U-shape for the participation rate of the employed is not compensated by jobrelated training among the non-employed population; for these groups participation was also higher in the first part of the 2000s than either before or later. From here on all findings refer exclusively to training for employed persons. Figure 2 shows what has been happening to the length of training episodes.
Respondents who had trained in the four previous weeks were asked to state the total length of the course. The proportion lasting less than a week, just over a third in the mid-1990s, was steadily rising through the 2000s. In 2012 a half of reported mostrecent training episodes lasted less than 1 week. A second, indirect indication of duration is also shown in Figure 2 in the proportion of training in the 4-week period that is undertaken either partly or wholly "away from your job". Off-the-job training tends to be of longer duration than training on the job, and as a share it has fallen steadily, dropping 17 percentage points from 73% in 1995 down to 56% in 2012.
The QLFS data also includes consistent data on training duration in hours per week (the item remained identical in wording, and preceding items were also the same) for all quarters over 1995-1998, and The reported participation rate rose from 73.3% in 2004 to 78.0% in 2011 -high compared with other surveys in part because it only covers establishments of more than five workers. Yet it also shows a fall in volume: all of the increase in training participation which it records is of the less-than-two days variety, while the participation of employees in training for more than 10 days fell from 8.2% to 6.1% --the latter outweighing the former in its effect on average volume.
Thus, in respect of the annual participation rate in the latter half of the 2000s, two series show a fall in small fall in participation (ESS2 and BHPS), while EWCS suggests stability, and two (SES and WERS individuals) report a small rise.
Nevertheless in the three of these survey series which provide relevant evidence, training volume falls by very substantial amounts. It might be suggested that, to counterbalance the substantial cut in volume, training became more efficient -in other words, its unit training quality may have improved (Felstead et al., 2012) . Unfortunately, notwithstanding earlier influential qualitative studies (e.g. Steedman et al., 1991) , little attention has been devoted to studying trends in training quality in the aggregate. The QLFS asks whether the training leads (Wolf et al., 2006; Evans et al., 2013) . Moreover, the development of the competence movement enabled some certificates to be awarded after little training, through the recognition of existing skills. The persistence of certification may be due to the preoccupation of government policies with targets and consequent effects on funding streams.
The SES series offers some alternative information, derived from workers' reported experiences of training. Between 2006 and 2012 there was found to be little change in the proportions reporting that the training improved skills "a lot". However, there was a rise from 27.3% to 31.7% in the proportion of trained workers for whom the increased skills were non-transferable outside the industry. There was also a small but statistically significant fall from 59.6% to 57.0% in the proportion reporting that the training "has made me enjoy my job more".
These findings give just a weak hint of declining quality. But the evidence remains unclear and patchy, and our overall conclusion is that the available aggregate data on training quality are not good enough to evaluate the trends.
d) Training Volumes and the Changing Socio-Economic Composition of the

Workforce.
In the next section consideration will be given as to how far it is possible to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the decline in training volumes in Britain. Prior to that discussion, an obvious question surrounds whether the trends are concentrated among certain groups. To what extent is the decline associated with the changing personal characteristics of the labour force, and has the decline been greater or less among some types than others? On the demand side, there is a parallel question: to what extent is the decline associated with the changing structure of industry? Also of interest, to what extent is the decline experienced differentially across each occupational group or region, and is the decline felt more for smaller or larger establishments?
We addressed these issues using the QLFS with its large samples. Tables 3a to 3d present the results of models which look in turn at different aspects of the demand side. Table 3a considers industry. It examines whether training volume declined at faster or slower rates within some industries, after conditioning on the differences in personal characteristics. The decline in conditional training volume is found in all industries but is significantly greater in Hotels and Restaurants; since this began as a high-training industry, this implies a small degree of convergence. Table 3d shows that the fall was statistically neither higher nor lower in large workplaces compared with small ones.
These industrial, regional and occupational changes are of course inter-related, and these in turn are associated with changes in workforce characteristics. To assess whether, collectively, the changing composition along all these dimensions can account for the decline in training volume, we carried out a standard Oaxaca-type decomposition analysis. This analysis revealed that, of the 0.426 raw decline (as shown in Table 2 ), just 0.015 can be accounted for by the changing composition.
Thus, virtually all the change is happening within socio-economic categories, albeit to varying degrees as indicated by Tables 3a to 3d.
Discussion.
What our extensive investigation with multiple data sets has revealed is that a focus East European economies (Markowitsch et al., 2013; Mignon, 2013) .
The decline in Britain is a puzzle which may be impossible to fully unravel in retrospect, given the piecemeal nature of the information sources. We can with reasonable confidence set aside two possibilities. First, though an upward shift in the real cost of supply cannot be completely ruled out, we think it unlikely in an era of technological change in training delivery. Qualitative findings from employers suggest, if anything, the opposite (Felstead et al., 2012) . Second, there has been no evidence of a deteriorating mismatch between training demand and supply. The decline thus almost certainly reflects a fall in demand for training hours. And, as the analysis of Section 3d) showed, the changing socioeconomic structure does not begin to account for the fall.
Contrasting explanations for the fall will have different implications for our understanding of the knowledge economy. We highlight four possible accounts. First, following the managerial approach a fall in training demand could be attributed to managers becoming less optimistic about the value of skill formation for their businesses. Such a change could be privately rational if it reflects an unbiased estimate that the expected private returns from training have fallen in an increasingly flexible economy, or it might be simply a consequence of evolving business strategies in the context of deep uncertainty (Green, 2013) . In this perspective, a falling demand for skill formation is inherent in a "low-skills" trajectory for large swathes of the British economy, representing a trend away from the knowledge-economy. Union power, which is generally found to be positive for training Boheim and Booth, 2004) , has been declining, thus pulling the training trend in the same direction. During the period of training decline investment in fixed capital and in R & D, which might if it had risen increased the demand for skills, remained steady at only 17% of GDP until the 2008-9 recession when it collapsed to 14%; while investment in R & D remained unchanged at the relatively low figure of 1.8% of GDP. This narrative is clearly consistent with critiques of the knowledge economy.
Yet there are alternative accounts. A second explanation for training decline might be that, for a given level of job skill requirements, prior education may substitute for current training, and since education levels in the workforce have risen less training is needed. Given that education has expanded everywhere, this explanation might seem more convincing if training volumes had declined in most countries. Nevertheless, another substitute source of skills could be migrant workers.
A third explanation is that there could have been a radical transformation of the training function over the last fifteen years, greatly improving its efficiency. This gain might have derived from new training technologies, or from better targeting of training at employers' own needs in relation to their business strategies. In this explanation, this is the age of lean training, increasingly rational from a private perspective. However, from a social perspective lean training may also entail greater narrowness and a lower social return to training, which would still be pessimistic when set against widely-held aspirations for the knowledge-economy.
A fourth possible explanation of falling training volumes, however, has more positive ramifications. Theories of workplace learning in recent decades stress the significance of learning through participation in workplace activities, through working in teams, and through involvement in 'communities of practice' (e.g. Guile, 2001; Felstead et al., 2005; Lam, 2002) . The 'learning organisation' is both an ideal and a proposition about the prevailing trend of a knowledge economy. As learning and development practices evolve, it is possible that workplace learning could become less associated with training (Kessels, 2001) . Thus, processes of learning may have become better embedded in organisations, at least in those that have adopted high-involvement working practices. A careful design of work organisation, incentives to facilitate employee involvement, and inter-firm mobility in technologically dynamic regions may be enabling new forms of skill formation through tacit knowledge-sharing that substitute for the typical forms of training reported in surveys. Some SES evidence is consistent with this fourth explanation: the proportion who strongly agreed that they 
Conclusion and Recommendations.
While empirically distinguishing between explanations is beyond the scope of this paper, the mere fact of the radical fall in training volumes is the most substantive finding from this study. One might therefore question why falling training volumes have hitherto not been studied.
One answer might be the view that it is participation in training that matters, rather than volume. Yet such a view is mistaken: while many studies of training's effects do not look at the impact of longer duration, those that do show that longer training matters (Blundell et al., 1996; Bartel, 1995) . Equally, longer training courses are sure to cost more. A second answer could be that it has been more comfortable to focus on ii. In parallel it should be considered how to generate suitable regular indicators of the quality of training. There may be a need to generate multiple indicators in order to build the fullest possible picture. It would also be of value to monitor trends in aspects of work organisation that are conducive to learning in workplaces.
iii. It is important to continue monitoring funding in a consistent way, that is, through repeat surveys of investment attached to the Employer Skills Surveys. To support any subsidy/taxation policy, there should also be improved data on the share of training funding by individuals, employers and government. Table 2 , with model 2 including interactions of the controls with the trend. ** means significant at 1%. Source: QLFS; persons in employment. "Long" training refers to participation in multiple training spells where the longest three lasted in total more than 5 days in the year. Source: BHPS. All those in paid employment, over 16. 
